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Expatriation 
time the federal suit was initiated. Accordingly, the Court 
concluded that the civil suit was not foreclosed as a 
disruptive and premature venture into federal court. 
Second, the Court recognized that the Constitution 
made the State of Minnesota immune from sui ts by 
private individuals. The shareholder suit was plainly 
barred, accordingly, if it was understood to be an attempt 
to hold the state itself responsible. The Supreme Court 
explained, however, that since the shareholders had not 
identified Minnesota as the defendant, bur had named 
only the attorney general, their suit was not against the 
state itself and thus was not subject to the state's sovereign 
immunity. This second aspect of Ex parte Young is often 
called a fiction-form over substance. The shareholders 
had no quarrel with the attorney general personally. They 
sued him only because he was the official responsible for 
enforcing the statute to which the shareholders objected, 
and they wanted an injunction to keep him from doing 
what he regarded as his official duty to enforce the statute 
on the state's behalf. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
held that the attorney general could not assert the state's 
immunity to defeat the shareholder suit. 
The decision in Ex parte Young was a product of its 
times. Early in the twentieth century, the Suprem e Court 
often used the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a basis for invalidating state regulations of 
econom ic activity. To advance that agenda, it was helpful 
(if not essential) to open the federal courts to civil lawsuits 
by business interests. Thus Ex parte Young was part of a 
larger story that included cases like Lochner v. New York, 
198 U.S. 145 (1905), in which the Court invalidated state 
labor legislation. Decisions like Lochner are now largely 
disparaged as illusu ations of a Supreme Court bent on 
resisting modern social welfare programs. Yet the 
procedural framework that Ex pmte Young established in 
the economic context supports federal lawsuits in a wide 
range of extraordinarily important fields. For example, 
individuals who are threatened with criminal charges for 
expressing unpopular views can bring federal civil actions 
against responsible state officials and head off criminal 
prosecution in state court. Even more important, a state's 
sovereign immunity cannot be set up to defeat federal 
suits advancing federal constitutional rights-as long as 
individuals are careful to name only a state officer as the 
defendant, not the state itself. Accordingly, individuals are 
able to address unconstitutional actions by the states 
indirectly by suing one of the state's agents. 
SEE ALSO Federal jurisdiction; State Sovereign Immunity 
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EXPATRIATION 
Expatriation is the act of forsaking one's status of 
citizenship and with it one's duty of allegiance to the 
state. At the time of rhe American Revolution (1775-
1783), the prevailing legal view was that birth, not choice, 
determined citizenship and allegiance. T reaties marking 
the end of the revolution validated the decisions of 
colonists to opt out of British citizenship by birth in favor 
of citizenship by choice in the new republic, but this 
acceptance of expatriation by force of arms worked only 
retrospectively. The right of Americans to shift their 
allegiance elsewhere early ran afoul of a strong national 
interest in preserving U.S. neutrality. During the wars 
between France and England that spanned the turn of the 
nineteenth century, Americans were prohibited from 
taking up arms for either side. When the Connecticut-
born commander of a French privateer raised expatriation 
as a defense to his prosecution in United States v. 
Williams, 29 F. Cas. 1330 (C.C.D. Ct. 1799) (No. 17, 
708), Chief Justice O liver Ellsworth opined in the circuit 
court that U.S. law followed the common law in not 
recognizing expatriation without the consent of the 
sovereign. Other federal courts agreed and the Supreme 
Court, after skirting the issue in several cases, eventually 
concurred in Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. 242 (1830). 
Meanwhile, among the grievances that led to war in 1812 
had been the Royal Navy's practice of conscripting from 
U.S. vessefs at sea those seamen born subjects of the 
British Crown, without regard for their status as 
naturalized citizens of the United States. Other revolu-
tions in the Americas soon spread and accentuated the 
problem of substituted allegiances. By the middle of the 
nineteenth century, various bilateral agreements between 
the old world and the new provided for reciprocal 
recognition of the personal decisions of emigrants to 
change citizenship and transfer allegiance. Notable among 
American expatriates are the author Henry James (1843-
1916) and the entertainer Josephine Baker (1906-1975). 
Where states had once resisted expatriation, they grew 
increasingly disposed to strip citizenship in retaliation for 
conduct deemed disloyal. The Constitution of the United 
States assigns to Congress in Article I, Section 8, clause 3 
the power to create a domestic process of naturalization, 
that is, for recognizing new citizens by choice. By the close 
of the Civil War (1861- 1865), Congress had presumed a 
concomitant power to recognize, and thus to regulate, 
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expatriation. In the Act of March 3, 1865, Congress 
declared desertion and draft evasion to be acts of 
expatriation. This was the first law in which Congress, 
while paying lip service to expatriation as a personal right to 
choose, nevertheless insisted on imputing it from acts more 
or less ambiguous about allegiance. 
Other such laws followed into the next century, 
among them the Expatriation Act of 1907, in which 
Congress equated naturalization in a foreign state and 
taking a foreign oath of allegiance with expatriation. The 
same act of Congress declared that a woman's marriage to 
a foreigner cost her citizenship in the United States. In 
Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915), the Supreme 
Court agreed that Congress could make an act of 
expatriation out of a woman's choice of a foreign 
husband, notwithstanding her objection that she had 
intended by her nuptials nothing of the sort. In the 
Nationality Act of 1940, Congress added to the list of 
conduces proving a U.S. citizen's intent to expatriate: 
service in the government or armed forces of a foreign 
state, voting in a foreign election, and treason against che 
United States. Later, during the postwar Red Scare, 
Congress made expatriating acts out of attempts to 
overthrow the U.S. government by force, seditious 
conspiracy, and advocating violence to overthrow the 
U.S. government. Eventually, the Supreme Court ruled in 
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) that, notwithstand-
ing the Nationality Act, an American who voted in a local 
election while visiting another country did not forfeit his 
or her U.S. citizenship. According to the Court, Congress 
could not, through ordinary legislation, take away 
citizenship that the Constitution itself conferred directly 
in the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
SEE ALSO Citizemhip; Denatur-alization and Expatria-
tion; Naturalization and the Constitution 
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EX POST FACTO lAWS 
Ex post facto laws are retroactive criminal laws that punish 
individuals for acts committed prior to the adoption of 
such laws, when the acts were not crimes. Ex post facto is 
Ex Post Facto Laws 
Latin for arising after the fact. The U.S. Constitution, in 
Article I, Section 9, expressly excludes the power to make 
ex post facto laws from the powers granted to Congress. In 
addition, Article I, Section 10 expressly forbids the state 
government authority to make ex post facto laws. These 
clauses require only the adoption of laws that apply 
prospectively. 
The prohibition arose from opposition to the use of 
ex post facto laws in English history. The authors of the 
Constitution distrusted any kind of retroactive legisla-
tion. Alexander Hamilton (c. 1755-1804) in Federalist 
Papers No. 84 says that the use of ex post facto laws is a 
favorite of those who want a powerful instrument for 
tyranny. 
Prior w the earliest Supreme Court case on ex post 
facto laws, Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798), ex post facto 
prohibitions were thought to apply to both criminal and 
civil srarures. T he Calder case involved a dispute over the 
contents of a will and was thus a civil matter. H owever in 
Calder the Court limited the ex post fact prohibition to 
criminal laws, identifying four types of laws it considered 
ex post facto. These included laws working retroactively to 
criminalize an innocent action performed before the law 
was adopted; laws increasing the aggravation of a crime 
after its commission; laws increasing the punishment for a 
crime after the fact; and laws changing the rules of 
evidence after the commission of a crime, if they were 
detrimental to a defendant. These forms of ex post facto 
actions have dangerous poli tical possibilities. 
The Calder case has been controversial because it 
forced property owners to rely upon contract to protect 
property rather than the ex post facto clause. The case has 
been controversially cited as an example of "orginalist" 
thinking. Some contemporary critics of ex post facto laws 
want to see the p rohibition extended to civil laws in order 
to protect rights from arbitrary government actions. A few 
justices in the history of the court have argued that the 
case was wrongly argued and should be overturned. 
In dealing with ex post facto laws the Supreme Court 
allows legal procedures to be changed retroactively, but 
the substance of the law can only be changed prospec-
tively. In Gut v. Minnesota, 76 U.S. 35 (1869), the Court 
held that a change in the location of a trial was procedural 
and not substantive. 
In Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981), the Court 
issued a two-part test for defining an ex post facto violation: 
It said that to be retroactive it had to be passed after a crime 
was committed and that it must disadvantage the offender. 
T he test was further clarified in Collim v. Youngblood, 497. 
U.S. 37 (1990), when it ruled thar laws changing the 
defini tion of a crime to increase punishment are unconsti-
tutional. This rule was applied in Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 
433 (1997), when a prisoner's early-release credits were 
deleted by law, rea·oactively increasing his punishment. 
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